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NO. 48 NOVEMBER 2018 Introduction 
Stubbornly Germany First 
Options for Reducing the World’s Largest Current Account Surplus 
Heribert Dieter 
Germany continues to be a major exporter of both goods and capital. In 2018, the 
current account surplus – at about $340 billion – will continue to be the world’s 
largest. Whilst German policy-makers and society celebrate the surpluses as the result 
of the competitiveness of German companies, they persistently ignore the other side 
of the balance of payments. Germany finances consumption and investment – abroad. 
The repeated explanations of the German government – arguing that the surpluses 
reflect private decisions that cannot be influenced by government policy – are not 
convincing. The German government has many options to reduce or raise taxes and 
can shape incentives to save or invest, but prefers to ignore these opportunities. 
Whilst many German observers eagerly point to the self-interested economic policies 
of the United States, Germany itself continues to place its own interests above the 
legitimate concerns of both its European and Atlantic partners. A continuation of the 
“Germany First” economic policies of the past two decades would constitute both a 
burden for European integration and the global trading system. 
 
Germany’s persistently high current ac-
count surpluses are sources of concern in 
Europe and America. To date, the German 
Federal Government has neither succeeded 
in successfully initiating measures to reduce 
surpluses nor has it been able to explain 
convincingly why the surpluses should be 
unproblematic. The impact of German for-
eign trade policy on other economies with-
in and outside the European Union (EU) is 
considerable. The surpluses of well over 7 
per cent of Germany’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) contribute to rising debt levels in 
other economies, which in turn is regularly 
labelled by German politicians as being the 
results of irresponsible policies. But Germa-
ny’s policies themselves are equally irre-
sponsible, because the country’s high 
capital exports are only made possible 
by capital imports from other nations. The 
failure to address the high current account 
surpluses weakens Germany’s position as an 
advocate of a liberal world economic order. 
The German surplus since 2000 has con-
tributed to widespread disapproval of a 
further deepening of the international divi-
sion of labour. One effect is trouble in the 
European integration process; a second is 
the continuing reluctance to advance the 
liberal trade regime. In Europe, the partner 
countries rightly point to the costs they 
have to bear in order to facilitate positive 
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economic development in Germany: Financ-
ing their import surpluses requires them to 
borrow. Vulnerabilities are thus emerging: 
With interest rates likely to rise again in 
the future, the indebted economies run the 
risk of a financial crisis. Economic history 
clearly shows that capital-importing coun-
tries are highly likely to be confronted even-
tually with a decline in capital flows, and 
consequently with liquidity bottlenecks. 
Both Lenders and Borrowers 
Matter 
Surplus countries, on the other hand, 
do not encounter any barriers in today’s 
international economic order. As long as 
there are countries that are prepared to 
import capital, surplus countries can export 
capital, and thus build up claims abroad. 
Today’s world economic order would de-
mand a special degree of responsibility 
from countries with current account sur-
pluses. The reason is the asymmetric con-
sequences for deficit countries. The global 
economy operates like a system of commu-
nicating tubes, and the current accounts of 
all national economies balance each other 
out. Since current account deficits put 
economies in a dangerous debt situation, 
surplus countries should reduce their capi-
tal exports. This requires political action, as 
there are no automatic mechanisms to help 
reduce current account surpluses. 
German politicians and society lack the 
insight that their own capital exports can 
be problematic for other countries. The 
robust rhetoric of the American president 
may be inappropriate in tone, but it has 
a true core: Germany ignores the conse-
quences of its foreign economic policy for 
other economies, and thus inspires pro-
tectionist reflexes. Germany’s foreign eco-
nomic policy is double-edged: It emphasises 
the benefits of exports but fails to address 
the disadvantages of a model that sells 
goods to foreign countries while liberally 
handing out supplier credits. 
Germany’s policy destabilises inter-
national economic relations. To a degree, 
it is thus comparable to that of the United 
States (US) at the end of the 1920s and early 
1930s: Then, as now, there is an inexperi-
enced economic power that is driving 
the debtor countries deeper into debt while 
developing a sense of moral superiority. 
This perception became clearly visible 
during the European debt crisis starting in 
2010, when numerous observers in Germa-
ny accused the crisis states of irresponsible 
behaviour. In 2010, for example, Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel noted that any Swabian 
housewife would have cautioned against 
taking on extensive debt. Other German 
politicians supported this criticism. Foreign 
media, such as The Economist and The Guard-
ian, explained that, in Germany, “guilt” 
(Schuld) and “debt” (Schulden) are closely 
linked linguistically – but also in a norma-
tive way, as both “debt” and “debtors” are 
often denounced in the public discourse. 
However, the enthusiasm at home and 
abroad for the model of low debt recom-
mended by German politicians ignores the 
fact that the Swabian housewife is running 
a household, not a national economy: She 
can ignore the macroeconomic effects. Con-
versely, politicians ought to be wiser: An 
economy characterised by virtuous auster-
ity would suffer from weak overall eco-
nomic demand. 
As a country with persistent current 
account surpluses, Germany has every 
reason to rethink its own economic model 
as well. From an economic point of view, 
deliveries abroad were often given away for 
free because receivables had to be written 
off. The losses for the German economy 
amounted to between just under €300 bil-
lion and €730 billion, depending on the 
assessment method. Exported capital often 
had to be written off – for example in the 
case of investments in US real estate bonds. 
Although the current German economic 
policy favours the stakeholders directly ben-
efiting from exports – such as shareholders 
of German automobile companies and the 
employees – it also imposes high financial 
burdens on many German citizens. There-
fore, it is wrong to assume that the effects 
of the economic boom since 2005 – only 
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briefly interrupted by the global financial 
crisis in 2008 – are beneficial to the entire 
German society: A distinct group benefits 
much more than others. 
Why Are Current Account 
Surpluses an International 
Policy Issue? 
Since the turn of the millennium, Germany 
has been generating steadily increasing sur-
pluses in its current account. The OECD 
expects a new record surplus of $340 billion 
in 2018. Neither the German media nor 
the German government are very concerned 
about this. Rather, the high surpluses con-
tinue to be interpreted primarily as an ex-
pression of the performance of German com-
panies. Criticism from abroad – whether 
from the EU Commission, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), or the American gov-
ernment – has been, and continues to be, 
rejected as inappropriate. 
The continuing rejection of criticism 
from abroad permanently weakens Ger-
many’s reputation as a responsible player 
in international affairs that takes into 
account the interests of other states. For 
decades, German policy-makers have tried 
to be perceived as acting unselfishly, both 
in relation to other European countries and 
in relation to the US. The ongoing reproof 
of foreign critics, as either being ignorant 
of the economic context or unable to under-
stand the benefits of Germany’s surpluses, 
does not fit in with the model of a policy 
that propagates international cooperation. 
Moreover, the focus of many German ob-
servers on the current account – one side 
of the balance of payments – is wrong 
because it ignores the capital account, the 
other side of the balance of payments. By 
definition, current account surpluses are 
accompanied by capital exports. The Bank 
for International Settlements has labelled 
capital exports as “vendor financing”. 
In 2017, the IMF pointed out that, in the 
1920s, a comparable problem was observed. 
The US and France, which were generating 
current account surpluses at the time, were 
not prepared to reduce them. This made 
it difficult for capital-importing countries 
such as Germany and Great Britain to cope 
with their high debt levels and paved the 
way for the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The lack of flexibility in exchange rates – 
the gold standard applied – and demand-
dampening policies in the creditor states 
show parallels to the current situation. 
An economy that produces current 
account surpluses builds up receivables vis-
à-vis foreign countries. Net exports of goods 
and net capital exports are one and the 
same. In other words, Germany uses a sig-
nificant part of its unconsumed economic 
income to build up claims on foreign coun-
tries instead of investing it domestically. 
Since Germany has been doing this for 
many years, the number of claims on for-
eign countries has risen sharply. However, 
creditors such as Germany can also lose 
capital: If debtors cannot, or do not want 
to, service the liabilities, the creditor must 
waive claims and make write-downs. In 
recent years, Germany has had this un-
pleasant experience and lost several hun-
dred billion euros. 
From 2004 up to, and including, 2018, 
Germany’s accumulated current account 
surpluses amounted to $3,508.6 billion. 
There is no sign of a significant decrease 
in surpluses. As a share of GDP, the current 
account surplus reached its highest level 
of 9.0 per cent in 2015. For 2018, the OECD 
expects a surplus of 8.3 per cent of GDP and 
only a small decline to 7.9 per cent of GDP 
in 2019. The current account surpluses are 
matched by exports of domestic savings. The 
high level of savings in Germany has become 
a problem because capital has not been in-
vested in Germany but rather abroad – and 
investments have not always been sound. 
The Perspectives of Foreign 
Observers 
Abroad, Germany has been receiving 
heavy criticism for several years. Christine 
Lagarde, then French Finance Minister and 
now IMF Managing Director, had already 
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found clear words for Germany’s surpluses 
in 2010. She considered these to be a bur-
den for other eurozone members and 
pointed out that it is not enough to insist 
on compliance with deficit rules. Lagarde’s 
blunt warning breached a taboo in Franco-
German relations. 
Simon Tilford, a British economist, criti-
cises the fact that the Federal Government 
and the media in Germany repeatedly an-
nounce imminent reductions in current 
account surpluses, which then never come 
to pass. He speaks of “waiting for Godot”. 
It would, Tilford argues, be beneficial for 
all concerned parties if the surpluses were 
gradually eliminated. British journalist 
Martin Wolf has been criticising Germany 
for years. He renewed his criticisms of Ger-
many’s current account surpluses in 2016, 
rightly asking of what productive use Ger-
man capital is for other countries if it can-
not be used in Germany itself. German 
savings are exported and not invested in 
roads, schools, or factories. Furthermore, 
it remains unclear to him why structural 
reforms in other economies should lead to 
an investment boom that has yet to take 
place in Germany. 
In 2017, the EU Commission repeated its 
diplomatic criticism of Germany. In particu-
lar, reference was made to the impact of 
surpluses on other countries. A reduction 
in the surplus would favour the prospects 
for a rebalancing in the rest of the euro 
area and the EU. The Commission’s view is 
shared by the IMF, which regularly analyses 
the effects of cross-border flows in its “Ex-
ternal Sectors Reports”. The IMF describes 
surpluses of more than 4 per cent of GDP as 
being “substantially stronger than [is] justi-
fied by fundamental data”. The IMF blames 
the very strict fiscal policies in some coun-
tries, including Germany and the Nether-
lands, for the high surpluses. The US also 
continues to complain about Germany’s 
surpluses and criticises Germany for not 
taking advantage of its fiscal leeway: If the 
German government were to collect fewer 
taxes and investment more, for instance in 
digital infrastructure, less capital would be 
exported. 
The Economist dedicated a cover story to 
Germany’s current account surpluses in 
July 2017. The title of the article was “Vor-
sprung durch Angst” (Advantage through 
Fear). The magazine noted that Germany is 
hopelessly linked to a model that considers 
exports to be more important than all other 
economic policy goals. Some foreign observ-
ers very clearly point out the role of Ger-
man policy in creating the framework con-
ditions for the high surpluses. During the 
reign of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, 
Germany had carried out a “fiscal devalua-
tion”. Social security contributions were 
reduced for employers, while value-added 
tax (VAT) was increased. Social security con-
tributions are paid by exporters but not by 
importers. The exact opposite is true of VAT: 
This does not have to be paid by exporters. 
Those observers interpret the restructuring 
of Agenda 2010 as a conscious economic 
policy leading to a strengthening of the ex-
port economy and the activation of import-
competing companies. Of course, this policy 
could be corrected if Germany so wished: A 
reduction in VAT, coupled with an increase 
in employers’ social security contributions, 
would strengthen the purchasing power 
of the population and dampen the com-
petitiveness of businesses. 
The Position of German Observers 
and the Federal Government 
In Germany, the debate about the benefits 
of current account surpluses, “Leistungs-
bilanzüberschüsse”, is probably already suffer-
ing from the fact that the term “Leistung” 
(performance) appears in it and has a posi-
tive connotation. “Leistung” is considered 
desirable. Many observers apparently have 
the impression that an economy with a 
high current account surplus “achieves” 
more than economies with current account 
deficits. Seemingly, many observers mis-
interpret the downsides of high capital 
exports. In Germany, a marked pride in the 
high surpluses and status as the “export 
world champion” has developed – without 
regard for the economic effects. The English 
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term “current account” could also be used 
in German, but few observers make refer-
ence to the “Bilanz der laufenden Posten”. 
If this term was used instead of “Leistungs-
bilanz”, it would be clear that it is a part of 
the national accounts and not an indicator 
of the strength or weakness of an economy. 
It is remarkable that, although there 
has been a lot of discussion in Germany in 
recent years about the supposed leadership 
responsibility that Germany should assume 
in Europe, possibly even globally, little time 
has been devoted to examining the con-
ditions for a leading role. Occasionally, one 
might receive the impression that other 
countries only have to follow the German 
example in order to be successful. Slowly, 
very slowly, it seeps through that the string 
of pearls of international crises may also 
have something to do with Germany’s pur-
suit of its national economic interest. Whilst 
nobody uses the term “Germany First”, the 
reality is that the country has put its eco-
nomic interests above those of its partners. 
The reaction of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance to criticism from abroad in 2013 
reflected the ruling opinion in Germany: 
These surpluses are, according to the Minis-
try, no cause for concern – neither for Ger-
many nor the eurozone or the entire global 
economy. In addition, the Ministry argued 
that there had been a reduction in current 
account balances within the eurozone. 
In 2017, the German government con-
tinued to insist on a perspective that ig-
nores the capital account. It pointed out 
that the current account surpluses are the 
results of supply and demand decisions by 
companies and consumers on the world 
market. In a joint position paper published 
in May 2017, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Economics tried to invali-
date the critics’ arguments. The title is 
already revealing: It talks about German-
American trade relations. Capital move-
ments do not appear in the heading. The 
tone of the text is apologetic. Overall, Ger-
man politics is helpless because the current 
account surplus is caused by private actors. 
Is it appropriate to regard the conse-
quences of private decisions as unchange-
able and irrelevant to economic policy? In 
recent years, the Federal Government has 
taken responsibility for erroneous decisions 
by private actors in the event of financial 
crises. With regards to Greece, the conse-
quences of the decisions of private creditors 
were not ignored, and crisis management 
was not left to the London Club, which 
would have been the appropriate institu-
tion for restructuring privately held debt 
of a public borrower. Instead, the German 
government, the EU Commission, the IMF, 
and other member states of the eurozone 
developed a plan to rescue creditors. The 
policy was not determined by laissez-faire, 
laissez-passer, but by the need for compre-
hensive and ongoing crisis management. 
Such behaviour is inconsistent: Either 
politicians ignore the incorrect decisions 
made by private actors when exporting 
capital or they deal with it. Then, however, 
they should not intervene asymmetrically 
only when crises arise, but take measures 
to reduce risks beforehand. 
The German government likes to point 
out to critics that it is not in a position 
to influence the level of surpluses. This 
is simply incorrect because the state has a 
direct influence on current account and 
capital account balances. A government 
surplus increases capital exports; a govern-
ment deficit lowers it. The Federal Govern-
ment, through its policy of balanced budg-
ets, therefore actively refrains from making 
a contribution to reducing the current 
account surpluses. Other countries must 
therefore live beyond their means and 
borrow so that Germany can export ex-
cess savings. The perfidious twist is that the 
German government then criticises these 
economies for living beyond their means. 
Losses to Date As a Result of 
Capital Exports 
However, it is not only the negative con-
sequences for capital importers that should 
be taken into account when evaluating Ger-
man capital exports. The cumulative cur-
rent account surpluses would have to be 
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identical to claims on foreign countries. In 
the past, Germany has been forced to make 
massive write-downs on assets abroad. 
The ambiguity of Germany’s foreign eco-
nomic policy is very clear: On the one hand, 
export performance and the export of goods 
create jobs and growth in Germany, and on 
the other hand, the frequent write-downs 
on foreign investments prevent citizens 
from benefiting adequately from the succ-
esses. The delivery of goods – such as cars 
to the US – often took place without con-
sideration of the financing side. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, the cars were 
given away. 
The IMF has clearly identified this prob-
lem of capital-exporting economies. Surplus 
countries often have to accept partial losses 
of their savings. In addition, the high sav-
ings levels of surplus countries lead to the 
increased availability of capital, which 
has a dampening effect on interest rates. 
According to this view, it is German savers 
who are themselves responsible for the low 
interest rates on their savings. 
So why does Germany stick to a model 
that has serious disadvantages? What 
happens to the high volume of claims on 
foreign countries? Net current account sur-
pluses would have to be reflected through 
an increase in so-called net foreign assets. 
This is the sum of foreign receivables, less 
the receivables of foreigners. 
According to OECD figures, the cumula-
tive current account surpluses from 2000 
to 2016 amounted to just under $2,900 bil-
lion. At an exchange rate of $1.18 to the 
euro, this corresponds to about €2,460 bil-
lion. However, German foreign assets 
amounted to only €1,727 billion at the end 
of 2016; €733 billion had to be written off. 
This represents a loss of 29.8 per cent, or 
23.4 per cent of the annual economic out-
put of €3,134 billion (2016). Converted to 
the number of inhabitants, this results in 
an arithmetical loss per German citizen of 
a remarkable €8,863. Consequently, Germa-
ny’s investors have not achieved any in-
crease in the value of their foreign invest-
ments, but have instead lost a lot of money 
abroad. 
The assessment that Germany has to 
provide for demographic change and that 
exporting savings is therefore a wise strat-
egy omits a central fact: The countries that 
import German capital are also struggling 
with ageing populations. However, Germa-
ny’s trading partners are building up liabil-
ities. Even at second glance it is not clear 
why it should be possible for other ageing 
societies to pay back capital to Germany. 
Future German pensioners should not count 
on American, British, or Italian pensioners 
lowering their standards of living in order 
to service the loans previously taken out. 
Some Options for Economic and 
Fiscal Policy to Reduce Surpluses 
Is doing nothing a sensible policy? Whilst 
of course possible, such a policy entails 
considerable risks for the stability of the 
integration process in Europe and today’s 
liberal world trade order. It seems conceiv-
able that trading partners will take defen-
sive measures against German surpluses. 
The new Italian government is clearly on a 
collision course currently with other Euro-
pean countries. Whilst the rhetoric of some 
Italian policy-makers is blunt, their motiva-
tion is obvious: Italy is mired in lasting eco-
nomic stagnation. Germany enjoys record 
levels of employment, but policy-makers 
see no need for reducing the exportation 
of capital and unemployment. That narrow 
interpretation of international economic 
relations is a burden for Europe. A respon-
sible player would consider the effects of its 
performance on other countries. Germany 
is weakening the European integration pro-
cess with its high surpluses. 
Germany has four main options for 
reducing Germany’s current account sur-
pluses, and thus the export of capital: The 
country could export less or import more. 
Just as effective would be a reduction in 
domestic savings. However, the optimal 
way to reduce the current account sur-
pluses is to increase domestic investment. 
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Increase in government investment 
A factor over which the state has direct 
influence is state investment. An increase 
in government investment would have a 
comparatively rapid impact on the develop-
ment of the current account. However, 
there is a problem: How can these addition-
al funds be spent sensibly? There are cer-
tainly many examples of overdue improve-
ments – for example to the infrastructure. 
However, the objection that today’s signifi-
cantly streamlined public administrations 
would no longer be in a position to control 
additional annual public investments 
of €30 billion cannot be prematurely dis-
missed. 
Increase in domestic demand due 
to significant real-wage increases 
In particular, the strengthening of domestic 
demand is repeatedly recommended as a 
panacea. According to the theory, a notice-
able increase in wages paid in Germany 
would not only strengthen import demand, 
but also dampen the competitiveness of 
German companies, and thus facilitate an 
upswing in other European countries. But 
here the critics of Germany are mistaken. 
If wage increases do not flow into the con-
sumption of foreign goods but lead to an 
increase in domestic savings, higher wages 
would lead to a further expansion of capital 
exports. 
However, it is true that wage levels in 
Germany did not fully reflect Germany’s 
economic performance in the past. Com-
pared to suppliers from other European 
countries, German producers are too cheap. 
This problem could be solved both by rais-
ing wages and increasing profits. There is 
no doubt that the German trade unions 
are in a comparatively weak position: They 
know that higher wages are possible and 
financially viable, but at the same time the 
options of the companies ought to be taken 
into account. Trade unions that rely on 
drastic increases in wages are thus spurring 
investment abroad and fuelling reductions 
in domestic investment. 
Temporary reduction in VAT 
The economist Carl Christian von Weiz-
säcker has proposed a significant reduction 
in VAT, from 19 to 14 per cent, in order to 
reduce the current account surpluses. Firstly, 
von Weizsäcker justifies this with Germa-
ny’s interest in a continuing integration 
process in Europe. Secondly, he sees only 
two ways out of the current situation in 
Europe: either a transfer union, which re-
distributes in favour of the poorer econo-
mies of the eurozone, or the introduction 
of a current account restriction. 
A reduction in VAT would particularly 
support recipients of small incomes. Con-
sumption would become cheaper. The 
reduction would send a clear signal to Ger-
many’s partner countries. Certainly it is not 
possible to reduce VAT without violating 
other fiscal objectives. A significant decline 
in government revenues would result in 
new government deficits and violate the 
goal of reducing public debt. However, 
in consideration of the importance of the 
goals, temporary new government debt is 
the lesser evil compared to stagnation in 
European integration or the strengthening 
of mercantilist policies in non-European 
partner countries of Germany. 
Reduction in private savings by 
abandoning the retirement age limit 
In Germany, people have to retire at a set 
age. There is limited flexibility, but that 
requires the consent of the employer. 
Workers should be given the right to con-
tinue working beyond the normal age limit 
by unilateral declaration. That measure 
would remove the pressure to save a certain 
amount for retirement. As a positive side 
effect, the labour force potential could be 
increased. In its latest consultations with 
the German government, the IMF has illus-
trated the positive effects of raising the 
retirement age. 
Higher taxes on corporate profits 
German companies make major contribu-
tions to the current account surpluses. The 
financial balance of companies has changed 
drastically in recent years. In 2000, com-
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panies in Germany were still borrowers and 
net debtors. Change has been taking place 
since 2009, and companies in Germany 
have been net creditors since 2016. In 2000, 
the net borrowing of private companies was 
considerable: at minus 4.8 per cent of GDP. 
In 2016, private firms were net savers and 
generated savings of 2.9 per cent of GDP. 
The financial position of the private sector 
was effectively reversed and the balance 
rose by 7.7 per cent of GDP. The IMF’s chief 
economist underlined that the high savings 
levels of companies are important sources 
of German capital exports. But are taxes on 
corporate profits really low in Germany? 
The OECD has examined both the share 
of taxes on corporate profits in total tax 
revenues and the corresponding share of 
GDP. In both categories, Germany is – from 
the point of view of companies – a tax 
haven. The OECD study does not analyse 
nominal tax rates, but actual taxes levied. 
In Germany, the share of taxes on corporate 
profits fell from 6.12 per cent to 4.72 per 
cent of total tax revenues between 2006 and 
2015. In the US, for example, the figure was 
8.33 per cent in 2015, and the OECD aver-
age was 8.86 per cent. The share of taxes on 
corporate profits was lower only in France 
(4.64 per cent), Hungary (4.71 per cent), and 
Slovenia (4.03 per cent). 
Furthermore, the picture does not change 
when considering taxes on corporate profits 
as a proportion of GDP. Once again, the 
figure in Germany fell from 2.11 per cent 
of GDP in 2006 to 1.74 per cent in 2015. In 
2015, only three OECD countries had lower 
taxes on corporate profits (Latvia, Slovenia, 
Turkey). The OECD average was 2.8 per 
cent. 
Conclusion 
Germany has become a burden for its part-
ner countries and is causing imbalances in 
international economic relations. The coun-
try sees itself as a model student. Many 
Germans believe that the robust economic 
growth and the high degree of integration 
into the global economy are proof of the 
superior organisation of the German econo-
my. Very few people think about the effects 
of the German surpluses on other European 
economies and the US. Hardly anybody con-
siders the contribution of Germany to vul-
nerabilities in other economies due to its 
high levels of capital exports. At the same 
time, however, other countries are accused 
of behaving irresponsibly because they 
incur debt with Germany. Bluntly stated: 
Germany preaches moderate borrowing, 
but its capital exports fuel credit booms 
elsewhere. 
Germany’s current account surpluses 
are not only due to the better economic 
performance of German companies, but 
also to political measures. Corporate taxes 
are very low compared to other OECD coun-
tries, which allows companies to accumu-
late large sums of cash, which are then 
transferred abroad and invested there. 
The state no longer relies on savings in the 
country, but it has been in the black for 
several years. The tax system favours ex-
porting companies and places a compara-
tively heavy burden on employees outside 
exporting companies. 
The most important point is simple: The 
Federal Government ought to identify the 
reduction in capital exports as a political 
task. At stake are not only Germany’s repu-
tation as a responsible and constructive 
player in international relations, but not 
least the future of the European integration 
process and the further development of 
globalisation. As an important power in 
Europe and the global economy, Germany 
ought to consider the consequences of its 
actions for other countries. To stabilise the 
European integration process and prevent 
the further discrediting of globalisation, 
Germany must change its foreign economic 
policy and swiftly reduce the high surpluses. 
Prof Dr Heribert Dieter is Senior Associate in the Global Issues Division at SWP and Visiting Professor for International 
Political Economy at Zeppelin University, Lake Constance.  
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